Southern Business Review
Volume 7

Issue 1

Article 3

April 1981

Holding Company Presence and Changes in Deposit
Concentration in Local Banking Markets
Duane B. Graddy*
Middle Tennessee State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/sbr
Part of the Business Commons, and the Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Graddy*, Duane B. (1981) "Holding Company Presence and Changes in Deposit Concentration in Local
Banking Markets," Southern Business Review: Vol. 7: Iss. 1, Article 3.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/sbr/vol7/iss1/3

This article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Southern Business Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Georgia Southern. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@georgiasouthern.edu.

H OLDING COMPAN Y PRESENCE AND
CHAN GES IN DEPOSIT CONCENTRATION
IN LOCAL BANKING MARKETS
Duane B . Graddy*

I. INTROD UCTI ON
The influence of bank holding company (BHC) presence on the structure of local banking markets has received only brief attention in the
literature. This neglect is somewhat surprising because there are several
reasons to believe that BHC entry will affect the degree of market concentration. First, if the expressed aspirations of BHC officials arc realized, affiliated banks may actually offer an increased quantity of better
quality financial services after acquisition. This could result in an improvement in the deposit share of the affiliated ban ks relative to their independent competitors.
Second, the diversification possibilities of the BHC organization may
allow the affiliated banks to expand loan output, fostering an increase in
market share. In addition, the financial strength of the parent company
may permit the affiliated bank to use more aggressive nonprice competition (e.g ., more branches) than their independent counterparts.
A third a~pect of this question is the attitude of bank regulators
toward allowable entry candidates. Concerns over the anti-competitive
impact of BHC entry has led to a regulatory stance in opposition to the
acquisition of large firms and favoring de novo or foothold penetration.
The net effect on the level of market concentration as a result of these
factors will depend on the nature of the entry vehicle; i.e., de novo,
foothold, or dominant firm. De novo entry or a strengthening of the
market position of a foothold acquisition would result in deconcentration. On the other hand, an increase in relative deposit growth for an entrenched firm could exacerbate the inequality among market participants.
Whether BHCs affect competition in local banking markets is particularly important in light of recent appeals to rescind the Douglas
Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act. This Amendment prohibits BHCs from owning banks in more than one state. Proponents of
its repeal argue that greater geographic expansion by BHCs will increase
competition in local banking markets with substantial benefits accruing
to consumers.
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether BHC presence has
an effect on the trend or change in market concentration; and if so, what
is the direction of the impact. Section II briefly reviews the empirical
literature pertaining to BHC entry and local market concentration. Section Ill discusses the sample and methodology employed in the present
study. Section IV presents the regression results while Section V considers the implications of the findings.

•The financial support of Middle Tennessee State University through Faculty
Research G rant 1-30123-0009 is gratefully acknowledged.

II. REVIEW Of' THE LITERATURE
Only a handful of studies have attempted to estimate the impact of
BHC presence on market concentration. The studies reported in Table 1
include those that approach the question directly [3 ; 5; 13; 14; 15; 20) as
well as others (4; 8) from which some conclusions on the issue can be
drawn. It should be noted at the outset that the studies use two general
approaches. The first group analyzes the market share data for individual affiliated banks while the other views market concentration in
the aggregate. The present study falls into the latter category.
Fraser [3] examined the influence of BHC affiliation on the market
share of 102 sample banks selected from all approved BHC acquisition
applications during 1970. The share in total market deposits of each affiliated bank was measured as of 1970 (base year) and 1974 (terminal
year). A "t" statistic was employed to test for differences between the
mean levels of market share between the two dates. Fraser concluded
that the market share of affiliated banks had not increased significantly,
but in fact, had shown a slight decline. A second study by Fraser [4) was
not specifically aimed at the impact of BHC affiliation on market concentration; nevertheless, the results provide useful insights into the issue.
In this study, Fraser analyzed the effect of holding company status on
the deposit growth of the sample banks. Examination of the preacquisition growth rate. the post-acquisition growth rate, and the
changes in the rates between the pre- and post-acquisition period showed
no significant difference bet ween affiliated and independent banks.
Goldberg [SJ tested the null hypothesis that the average change in
market share for acquired banks was equal to zero against the alternative
hypothesis that it was not. He concluded that the market share of acquired banks was generally unrelated 10 their status as a BHC affiliate.
The study by Heggestad and Rhoades (8) is somewhat different than
the others listed in Table I. This paper focuses on the general determinants of changes in market concentration. However, particular emphasis was placed on three policy variables: mergers, holding company
activity, and branching laws. The regression results indicated that
markets in states which permitted multi-bank holding companies experienced more of an increase in concentration than markets in other
states.
- Whether foothold acquisitions by multi-bank holding companies had a
systematic influence on market structure was investigated by Rhoades
(13). The percentage change in the three-firm concentration ratio and the
Herfindahl index was related to foothold entry, market growth, deposits
per bank office, initial concentration, and a series of dummy variables
representing the year of the first foothold acquisition. The foothold
dummy variable was insignificant in all of the regression equations.
In (14), Rhoades tested the hypothesis that the geographic expansion
of BHC organizations would tend to decrease concentration in local
banking markets. The change in market structure was measured by the
first difference in the three bank co ncentration ratio, I 966-1976.
Rhoades concluded that relatively high expansion activity by BHCs in a
state does not influence concentrat ion in local markets.
Evidence of deconcentration in two Colorado banking markets
entered through foot hold acquisition prompted Rhoades and Schweitzer
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TABLE I
Studies of the Impact of BHC Entry on Market Concentration
Studies By Author

a nd Reference Citation

Time

Period

Sample

Fraser [3]
Fraser [4]

1970-1974
1967-1973

102 banks
260 banks

Goldberg [5]
Heggestad and Rhoades [8]

1965- 1970
1966-1972

71 banh
228 SMSA's

Rhoades (13)

1966-1972

112 SMSA's

Rhoades [14)

1960-1976

Rhoades and Schweitzer [ I SJ

1966-1976

154 SMSA 's
and 129
counties
70 SMSA's

Whitehead and King (20)

1970- 1974

98 banking
market s

Results
No significant change in market share of acquired banks.
No significant impact on deposit growth of acquired
banks.
No significant change in market share of acquired banks.
Markets in states permitting BHCs experienced more of an
increase in concentration than markets in other states.
No significant relationship between BHC foothold entry
and market structure.
Geographic expension activities of BHC organizations
does not innuence local market concent ration.
No significant relationship between BHC foothold entry
and market structure.
No systematic relationship between BHC entry and
changes in deposit concentration .

(15) to reconsider the impact of BHC foothold entry on market concentration. In general, the findings of this study were the same as the first
one (13). Foothold acquisition had no statistically ~ignificant effect on
market structure.
Whitehead and King [20] investigated the impact of BHC entry on
local market structure in three Sixth District states. The local market
areas used in the study were those designated by the Board as banking
markets in the determination of section [3(a)( 1)) applications. Market
structure wa5 proxied by the three-bank concentration ratio, the Herfindahl index, and the change in the Herfindahl index 1970-1974. Approximately 10 percent of the market areas sho"'ed an increase in concentration. However, a thorough analysis of each market where concentration
increased showed that holding company activity had little innuence on
the level of concentration.
While these studies provide useful insighb into the impact of BHC
presence on market concentration, they nonetheless involve several important shortcomings. First, they do not make a clear distinction between short-run and long-run changes in concentration. Some of the effects of BHC entry may be perceptible only in terms of a long-run
measure of structural change, i.e., one that encompasses several years.
Second, in most of the studies no attempt is made to determine the length
of holding company presence in the market. Third, the studies fail to account for the interaction between initial concentration and BHC entry.
The initial level of concentration may be an important argument in the
regulatory decision function. Finally, there is no analysis of the interrelationship between BHC entry, the complexity of local branching systems,
and market 5tructure. The present study attempts to overcome these deficiencies.

Ill. ',AMPLE AND METHODOLOGY
Sample

The sample for this study includes the 95 county bankmg markets in
Tennessee over the period 1960- 1974 .' During this time span, the number
of banks in the ~late grev. from 290 to 335. Total banking offices expanded from 670 to 1056. Between 1960 and 1974, the number of county
markets penetrated by dome5tic BHCs increased from 5 to 37. The total
number of affiliated banks in the state grew from 5 in 1960 to 61 in 1974.
Furthermore, by 1974, BHC affiliate~ had a market share in total
deposits of 30 percent or greater in 70 percent of the markets penetrated.
Thus, Tennessee provides a dynamic setting in which to analyze the impact of BHC entry on local market concentration.
' Despite the many problems associated with pragmatic definitions of
geographic banking markets, as a first approximation, county boundaries were selected. Alternatives to this definition are, of course,
SMSAs or Ranally Metro Areas (RM A s). However, use of county boundaries in this study seems justified for two reasons. First, branching in
Tennessee is limited to th e county of the home office. Second, most
banks in Tennessee are located in rural areas - eighty-three percent of
the counties in Tennessee were classified as nonSMSA in I 974 .
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Methodology
Although market entry by BHCs is one determinant of the trend in
concentration, several other factors may influence the structure of local
banking markets. Barriers to entry must certainly be considered in any
examination of changes in mark~t concentration. These barriers take
several different forms; however, they are generally related to high initial
market concentration.
Established banks may have certain strategic advantages over all actual and potential entrants and this may inhibit the entry of new firms.
These advantages include the "tendency toward close, longstanding
customer relationships and a positive relationship between size of bank
and both the maximum size of bank loans and the range of bank services
that may be profitably offered" [10, p. 5]. This "entrenchment"
hypothesis implies that high levels of initial concentration may be related
to smaller changes in concentration.
Another barrier to entry arises from the implementation of bank
chartering regulations. Salley I16] argues that in rural markets regulatory
concern is for stability rather than competition. New banks are permitted
into the market only if community demand is sufficient to assure survival
of the existing institution as well as the new entrant [16, p. 188]. High initial levels of concentration, which generally characterize rural markets,
may reflect this barrier to entry.
The ability of established banks to restrict entry by practicing limit
pricing may be related to high initial concentration (8, p. 65]. Whether
firms in high concentration markets actually implement such a policy will
depend on the elasticity of demand, cost advantages over new entrants,
and the length of time involved in the entry process.
Finally, the initial level of concentration is important because there is a
greater opportunity for concentration to increase (decrease) in low (high)
concentration market, than in high (low) concentration markets. The
predicted relationship between initial concentration and the change in
concentration is that the higher the initial level the lower the potential increasl? and vice versa.
Market growth is another potentially important factor in the determination of changes in the ,tructure of banking markets. High growth
rates spawn high expected profits, encouraging the entry of new banks
or, at least, creating the demand for new bank charters. In addition,
regulatory authorities look more favorably on charter requests where the
market area is growing rapidly. That is, it ma) be easier to justify the
need for a new bank in an expanding market than in a dormant one, and
also, in a growing market, the chances of creating exceisive competition
(resulting in failure) are lessened.
Technical considerations would re-enforce the concentration
mitigating effects discussed above. Studies have generally found steeply
declining average cost for small banks and no diseconomies for large
scale production. Thus. where the total market demand is srnall relative
to the minimum efficient size bank, high concentration is likely to occur.
The same technical considerations would encourage entrenchment where
the growth in demand for banking services was small (10, p. 3]. Rapidly
growing markets would permit small firms to exploit economies of scale
and thus foster deconcentration. Economies of scale in risk-taking would
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further re-enforce this tendency.
The number of banking offices, particularly branches, and the length
of time the BHCs have been operating in the market may influence the
trend in concentration. In a limited branching state, like Tennessee,
existing banks have the ability to restrict entry by establishing branches
in all prime locations. By using this strategy existing firms discourage
new unit banks by reducing or eliminating locations with high customer
intensity. Hence, the more extensive the branching network of the
existing banks, the greater is the potential for increased concentration.
The influence of BHCs on market structure may vary with the length
of market presence. For example, a de nova affiliate may have little impact on market concentration in the initial year of operation. However,
as the affiliated bank grows, it may erode the market position of entrenched firms. Likewise, the impact of a foothold acquisition may not
be felt for some time. As these firms gain the advantages of large-scale
promotion, customer loyalty, and increased service output, they may increase their share in total market deposits. Since regulatory authorities
generally opt for de nova or foothold acquisitions. the main impact of
BHC presence may take place in the intermediate-run, as the small affiliates find their niche in the market. However, to the extent that these
firms become barriers to future entry, their presence could be a factor encouraging increased concentration over time.
To capture the multifarious nature of market structure changes, the
following multiple regression model was specified:

6 C = f(C, BHC•, BHCt, BC. NO, G)
where 6 C refers to the change in market structure as measured by the
change in the Herfindahl index for deposits, 1970-1974: the change in the
Herfindahl index for deposits, 1960-1974; and the percentage change in
the number of banks, 1966-1974.
C indicates the initial level of concentration as proxied by the static
Herfindahl index.
BHC• represents a dummy variable indicating the presence of an affiliated bank in the market.
BHCt refers to the length of time the affiliated banks have been
operating in the market.
BC denotes the interaction between holding company presence and
initial market concentration.
NO indicates the number of branch offices in the county market.
G represents market growth as measured by the growth in retail sales.
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IV. REGRESSIO

...

RESULTS

The regression results reported in the upper portion of Table 2 show
the relationship between the change in the Herfindahl index for deposits,
1970-1974 and BHC market presence. In general, BHC presence was
associated with declining concentration (or less increase in concentration).' The change in concentration was also negatively related to the
initial Herfindahl index ( 1970) and market growth. That is, concentration declined more or increased less in markets with high initial concentration and rapid growth in market demand. The number of branch offices was not an influential factor in the determination of changes in the
Herfindahl index.
According to the first two equations in Table 2, the goal of regulatory
policy to use BHC entry as a vehicle lo deconcentrate local banking
seems to have been successful. In their evaluation of BHC acquisitions
bank regulators may use the initial level of concentration as a decision
parameter. If this is the case, BHC entry may have a greater impact in
high as opposed to low concentration markets. Although not shown in
Table 2, this hypothesis was examined for equation (2-1).
The interaction of BHC presence and market concentration was accounted for by adding the term BC to the equation. To test the
hypot hesis that BHC presence did not influence the change in concentration meant that the coefficients of all regressors involving BHC• were
jointly zero [ I 2, p. 456). The null hypothesis that the coefficients of
BHC• and BC were equal to zero could not be rejected at the 10 percent
level. Thus, the impact of BHC presence on the change in the Herfindahl
index did not differ between high and low concentration markets.
The length of time the BHCs have been active in the county markets
was proxied by three dichotomous variables: one year or less, one to
three years, and greater than three years. Changes in the short-run Herfindahl index were unrelated to the maturity of the BHC market. Equations (2-3) and (2-4) show the results for the relationship between BHC
market presence and the change in market structure, as measured by the

' BHCs tended to acquire banks in the most economically viable
markets in the state. For example, the mean population growth rate in
BHC counties was 5.8 percentage points above that of non holding company markets. The mean percentage of the population in urban areas for
BHC counties (excluding the four metropolitan counties) was 37 .5 percent compared to 17 .1 percent in all other counties. Mean income per
capita was $488 higher in nonmetropolitan holding company markets
than in market s with no BHC affiliate. The percentage of families in the
middle income range was 2. 7 percentage points higher in
nonmetropolitan BHC markets than in other counties. Thus, it might be
argued that the relationship between the BHC variable and the change in
concentration is spurious; reflecting the economic characteristics of the
market. However. many regressions were run including different market
variables (urban/rural mix, percentage middle income, total populatio~,
etc.), both individually and in varying combinations, and in no case did
the general conclusions concerning the BHC variable change.
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Tuhlc 2
Structural Chanl!,l'!> in BIIC Murkeh
(I ~tali\tic in purenlhesc~)

)0

Equalion
Number

lniliul
ConccnI ralion

BIIC*

Chan~e in Herrindahl
lndo 1970-1974
-0.0165t
-0.1265t
(2-1)
(1.6595)
(2.5991)
-0.1150t
(2-2)
(2.3080)
Change in Hrrfinduhl
lnde, 1960-1974
-0.1140t
(2-3)
-0.5097t
(3.7757)
(2.1227)
(2-4)
-0.5167t
(3.7104)
Percentage Change in Number
of Banl.s 1966-1974
0.2395t
(2-5)
0.853711
(1.8160)
( 1.4347)
(2-6)
0.7805#
(1.3855)

HH(',

-0,0398
(1.0117)

-0,0803
(0.9182)

0.0741
(0.3160)

IH-1(',

-0.0117
(0.5220)

-0.114311
( 1.4357)

0.0737
(0.4015)

tlnd1ca1es the cocffic,ent is ,1a1is1ically ,1gnaficant at the one percent level.
Und1cate, the cocffidcnl is statistically significant at the five pcrcenl level.
1Hndica1c~ the coefficient )s statistically ~1gnif11:ant at the ten nerccnt level.

No. or
Braurh
HIIC,

Ort"ices

Growth

Conslant

-0.000lt
(1.6617)
0.0001
(l.1533)

.0459

.1392#

-0.0056
(0.2847)

-0 .000 1
(0.2332)
-0.0003
(0.5181)

.0369

.1637#

.Q,0002t
(1.6217)
-0.0003t
( 1.6742)

.2431

.4055t

-0. l 320t
(1.9489)

0.0064t
(3.7627)
0.0066t
(3.6551)

.2515

.4086t

0.0005#
( 1.2974)
0.0006#
( 1.6202)

-,8458

.0736

0.4287t
(2.5372)

-0.0012
(0.3640)
-0.0039
(0, 7040)

-.8641

.0743

Markrl

R'

first difference in the Herfindahl index 1960-1974. The R''s for these
estimations are uniformly high in comparison to the first set of equations
and all are significant at the I percent level or better. BHC presence was
associated with declining (or less increasing) concentration in local banking markets. The length of market presence also had a negative impact
on the long-term trend in the Herfindahl index. As indicated by the
magnitudes of the regression coefficients the deconcentration effect increases with the maturity of the holding company market.
In addition, the decline in concentration was greatest (or the increase
least) in markets characterized by relatively high initial concentration (as
measured by the deposit Herfindahl index for 1960). Introduction of an
interaction term in equation (2-3) had little influence on the results. The
null hypothesis that the coefficients of BHC• and BC were equal to zero
could not be rejected at the 10 percent level. NO was positively related to
the change in the Herfindahl index; implying that concentration declined
less (increased more) in markets where branching networks were more
extensive. This finding follows the hypothesized relationship outlined in
Section 111.
The final group of regression equations reported in Table 2 show the
determinants of the net entry rate [I]. as measured by the percentage
change in the number of banks, 1966-1974, into local banking markets.
As expected market growth and the initial level of concentration were influential factors determining the rate of new bank formations. Bank
regulatory authorities would be more receptive to bank charter requests
in markets with high levels of concentration and characterized by rapidly
expanding demand. In addition, a certain level of market size or growth
may be necessary for new entrants to realize any existing economies of
scale. Expected profits may be a function of market growth also. Higher
expected profits would, ceteris paribus, encourage entry [!].
The rate of market entry was positively related to the dichotomous
BHC variable. A successful bank regulatory policy would imply this
result. To the extent that the Federal Reserve Board limits BHC expansion to de novo acquisitions, one would anticipate the relationship shown
in Table 2. Furthermore, the entry rate tended to vary between high and
low concentration BHC market s. A test of the null hypothesis that all of
the regressors involving BHC• were equal to zero was rejected at the .10
level. Thus, the interaction of BHC• and initial concentration had a
significant effect on the net entry rate. This result would seem to follow
from the use of the initial concentration level as a decision parameter by
regulatory authorities in holding company acquisition decision.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In general, empirical studies have found that BHC entry has little influence on the structure of local banking markets. These findings are
unexpected in light of the professed aim of bank regulatory policy.
Regulatory authorities have attempted to use BHC de novo and foothold
entry as vehicles to deconcentrate banking markets. This study provides
further evidence on the relationship between BHC entry and the change
in market structure. The sample for this investigation included the 95
county banking markets in Tennessee over the period 1960 to 1974. The
regression analysis examined the impact of BHC presence on changes in
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market structure over time intervals of varying lengths. The trend in
market structure was proxied by the change in the Herfindahl index,
1970-1974; change in the Herfindahl index, 1960-1974; and the percentage change in the number of banks, 1966-1974. Several different regression models were specified taking into consideration the longevity of
BHC market presence, complexity of local branching systems, rapidity
of market growth, initial level of market concentration and the interaction between market concentration and BHC entry.
The results were consistent with the view that BHC entry tends to
reduce concentration in local banking markets. The BHC dummy was
negatively related to all of the market structure measures. The rate of
new bank formations was positively related to the dichotomous BHC
variable. These findings may reOect the Federal Reserve's policy of encouraging de novo expansion. This concl usion is re-enforced by the fact
that the net entry rate was significantly higher in BHC markets with high
initial level5 of concentration. Such a result should follow from the use
of market structure as a criterion in decisions regarding holding company
expansion.
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